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 Abstract 
 
In this paper, we have initiated an attempt to develop and understand the driving mechanisms that underlies 
fourth-generation warfare (4GW). We have undertaken this from a perspective of endeavoring to understand 
the drivers of these events (i.e. the 'Physics') from a Complexity perspective by using a threshold-type 
percolation model. We propose to integrate this strategic level model with tactical level Big Data, 
behavioral, statistical projections via a ‘fractal’ operational level model and to construct a hierarchical 
framework that allows dynamic prediction. Our initial study concentrates on this strategic level, i.e. a 
percolation model. 
 
Our main conclusion from this initial study is that extremist terrorist events are not solely driven by the size 
of a supporting population within a socio-geographical location but rather a combination of ideological 
factors that also depends upon the involvement of the host population. This involvement, through the social, 
political and psychological fabric of society, not only contributes to the active participation of terrorists 
within society but also directly contributes to and increases the likelihood of the occurrence of terrorist 
events.   
 
Our calculations demonstrate the links between Islamic extremist terrorist events, the ideologies within the 
Muslim and non-Muslim population that facilitates these terrorist events (such as Anti-Zionism) and anti-
Semitic occurrences of violence against the Jewish population.  
 
In a future paper, we hope to extend the work undertaken to construct a predictive model and extend our 
calculations to other forms of terrorism such as Right Wing fundamentalist terrorist events within the USA. 
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God is Greatest, Death to America, Death to Israel, Curse on the Jews, Victory to Islam 
Motto on the Houthi group's flag   
           Always blame the Jews for everything 
Newsweek, 12/13/17, Report on Neo-Nazis in the USA 
             
1.0  Introduction 
 
Statistics is the science of mathematically examining  data. From this data, we seek patterns and correlations 
that hopefully explain what is going on within the data. Predictions made from statistics can be compared to 
driving a car whilst looking out of the rear window.  Causality is implicit and follows what logicians call the 
fallacy of affirming the consequent.  We observe b following a and then intuit that a causes b.  In statistics, 
this inference is supported by the process of mathematical correlation between observations.  We do not 
observe causality directly but rather build our theories on correlations between observed behavioral 
regularities. This ‘statistical’ methodology lies behind the current ‘Big Data’ processes in that data volume 
and computing power allows individualization of behavior and rapid (short time period) predictions. 
Physics, on the other hand, takes these observed behavioral regularities and derives theories of causation 
which are designed to make accurate and informed predictions. The distinction between the two sciences 
(physics and statistics) may be subtle but is profound.  
 
In this paper, we wish to develop and understand the physics that underlies terrorist events. These events 
may be seen as part of an overall new type of warfare where nation states have lost the monopoly of war. 
This new generation of warfare, labeled the fourth generation (4GW) [1], is that of wars undertaken by 
cultures against States. This type of warfare is, by definition, asymmetrical and defeat of the nation state my 
not necessarily be military but rather political. This paper concentrates on European Islamic terrorist events 
and UK anti-semitism as an ideological indicator simply due to the paucity of other data sources. The main 
conclusions from this initial study may be controversial but they are also far reaching: non-active dissuasion 
of terrorist ideologies (which we call 'passive support') populations not only directly contributes to the active 
participation of terrorists within society but also increases the likelihood of the occurrence of terrorist events. 
These conclusions have both social and political implications. The drivers for our mathematical framework 
are founded not upon facts (the ‘truth’) but rather narrative1: it is a set of beliefs within a population or 
population sub-set (an ideology) that allows the construction of an ideological sea within which terrorists 
can swim. This entails that ideological beliefs, whether they are false or not, become the ‘truth’ as they are 
axiomatic
2
. We see this ideological effect across all sides of the political spectrum particularly in the UK. 
Examples of this are: 
 The inability of the UK Labour Party to come to grips with its perceived institutionalized anti-
                                                          
1
 For example, the ‘belief’ rather than the ‘fact’ that ‘Jews control the media’. The concept that a population is 
constrained by a belief system maintained by the process of capitalization (in that non-material concepts as well as 
material objects may be commodities in the Marxian sense) was propounded by Guy Debord in his 1967 book 
‘The Society of the Spectacle’. An event or series of events are therefore then required to occur so that the ‘truth’ 
may be seen (in Debord’s language to create a ‘Situation’). A more recent example of this is Neo having to choose 
the red or blue pill in the Matrix film. 
2
 See for example https://www.telegraph.co.uk/education/2018/07/02/labour-responsible-rise-softcore-holocaust-
denial-dr-deborah/ 
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Semitism
3
 (a political belief system of the Left)
4
; 
 The inability of elements within the UK Muslim community to acknowledge or actively dissuade 
Muslim anti-Semitism (a religious belief system)
5
 
 The rise of popularism within Europe and the UK6 (a political belief system of the Right); 
 The rise of casual, every day, antisemitism in the UK7. 
 
 
In examining the Physics of these events, we seek to develop a theory which can lead to the efficient 
interdiction of terrorist behaviors. Our conclusion, therefore, is to propose to construct a hierarchical model 
that benefits from the advantages of both Complexity Science and Big Data Statistical methodology. Group 
behavior (i.e. the predictive modeling of ‘the whole is greater than the sum of the parts’) at a strategic level 
will be modeled by a Complexity (Percolation) type model, whilst individualization modeling (‘tactical 
level’, granular, data intensive Big Data model) would be applied in a ground up manner. Thus, the strategic 
and tactical would be able to validate each other dynamically.  
 
 
On 20 July 2015, at Ninestiles School in Birmingham, the then UK Prime Minister, David Cameron, set out 
his policy plans to address extremism and Islamic extremism [2].   This policy was part of the UK 
Government’s detailed response to ISIL, Iraq and Syria. Specifically, the Prime Minister gave four main 
reasons/causes for segments of the UK populace being drawn to Islamic terrorism: 
 
 Like any extreme doctrine, Jihadism can seem energizing, especially to young people; 
 The process of extremism is step-wise and starts with radicalization. When you look in detail at the 
backgrounds of those convicted of terrorist offences, many of them were first influenced by what 
some would call non-violent extremists; 
 Extremist ideology drives and sets the terms of the public and political debate; 
 With respect to the question of identity, there are many people born and raised in the UK who do 
not truly identify with the UK.  With respect to Islamic extremism, these individuals identify 
themselves first with a particular extremist creed, second with a particular religious and ethnic 
group and see their UK citizenship primarily as an accident of location.
8
 
 
The Prime Minister then went on to outline a number of policy directives that were aimed at countering the 
above four causes of terrorism: 
 
 Confronting, head on, extremist ideology, particularly by taking its component parts to pieces -  
especially the cultish worldview and the conspiracy theories of jihadism; 
 Tackling both parts of the extremist creed – the non-violent and the violent. This means 
confronting groups and organizations that may not advocate violence – but which do promote other 
parts of the extremist narrative;  
 Embolden different voices within the Muslim community and actively encourage the reforming 
and moderate Muslim voices; 
 The fourth and final part of the strategy is to build a more cohesive society, so that more people 
feel a part of it and are therefore less vulnerable to extremism and anti-social behavior.  
 
                                                          
3
 See https://blogs.spectator.co.uk/2018/04/jeremy-corbyn-and-the-far-lefts-anti-semitism-doublespeak/ 
4
 See https://www.thejc.com/comment/analysis/jeremy-corbyn-labour-definition-antisemitism-1.466626 
5
 See https://musliminstitute.org/freethinking/culture/sorry-truth-virus-anti-semitism-has-infected-british-muslim-
community 
6
 See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Right-wing_populism 
7
 See https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/may/03/everyday-antisemitism-britain-prejudice 
8
 Bernard Lewis (1998)  in The Multiple Identities of the Middle East,  explains that within Islamic society, 
identity is conceived of in a fundamentally different fashion than it is in the West.  He explains that historically, 
for example, the Ottoman Empire saw itself as the geographic successor to the Eastern Roman Empire, and still 
made references to this in official documents as late as the 19
th
 century.  In terms of identity, religious and tribal 
affiliations have virtually always superseded geographic location in Islamic culture. [3] 
4  
It is always advisable that governmental policy be supported by sound scientific discourse. The aim of this 
paper therefore is to use the above four-point policy framework  to provide a foundation by which we may 
build a dynamic model that describes, and hopefully goes some way towards predicting the occurrence of 
terrorist events. The process will follow studies undertaken with some success previously by the authors for 
attrition warfare by constructing a hierarchy of meta-models (i.e. building of an aggregated system of 
models giving greater and greater granularity) using the tools of Complexity Science: fractals, self-
organization, self-similarity and scale-free systems [4].  Note that within this paper, we work within a 
Eurocentric context; there are no reasons for not extending this work to other geo-social and geo-spatial 
areas.   However, the initial  paucity of data, and the fact that a previous study was based upon Spanish data 
(notably reference [14]) restrained us from extending our scope in the present paper.  
 
In previous work [4,5] we have presented evidence that suggests that further development, with agent based 
models, together with mathematical techniques such as dimensional analysis and graph theory, can be linked 
to historical data and fractal fingerprint behavior (i.e. a meta model hierarchy). In this prior work, we 
presented the idea that Statistical Thermodynamics could be used to examine agent based models of the geo-
social process that is 'Combat' (i.e. where humans come together within a social and geographical context 
called 'War' and attempt to kill each other).   
 
This set of insights naturally led us onto investigating percolation theory, critical systems, Barenblatt’s 
scaling and dimensional analysis methods [6], renormalization theory [7] and Per Bak’s self-organized 
criticality (SOC)[8].  Employing these methods eventually resulted in the derivation of a 'Universal Law' for 
attrition warfare, namely, the Fractal Attrition Equation [4]. Our present aim therefore is to develop a similar 
set of descriptors for terrorism. Predictive models are often touted as a way to test ideas, concepts or new 
theories. While those things can be simulated by an algorithmic model, the results from such a model do not 
'prove' anything. What this kind of model can do, however, is to shine a light on which interactions and 
relationships are important. Simple qualitative or descriptive studies cannot adequately reveal these features 
nor illumine their relationships.  The current paper has been designed with the purpose of providing a 
springboard by which we hope to gain insight into the dynamics that drive terrorist events and thus reveal 
the predictive drivers. We are thus, currently developing the tools to examine, model and predict a wider 
range of behavioral and associated processes. We hope to publish these results in a following paper.  
 
Our first question was how were we to construct a high-level model that described the human environment 
in which terrorists evolve, i.e. the social and geographical network space of the jihad.  Fortunately, there 
exists a model system that can be established as a high-level starting point: Serge Galam's percolation model 
[9]. Percolation is concerned with connectedness. For an example, we may take a board from the game of 
“Go”. If two stones are on adjacent sites they are said to be connected. After randomly placing stones on the 
board we get to a stage where it is possible to trace a connection from one side of the board to the other: this 
is where it is said that we have percolation.   So, at the precise point where a connected path appears 
connecting all of the islands, percolation is said to occur. Many natural phenomena act as if they are made of 
random 'islands' and under certain conditions, over time, one macroscopic continent emerges. 
Connectedness in a geo-social context is called social permeability.  Social permeability also describes the 
physical pathways that nodes (individual extremists) of the extremist networks can establish and use to 
move along freely and safely. In the Galam model, this freedom of movement is due to what Galam calls 
'passive supporters' of the extremist cause [10]. Note that permeability is satisfied without necessarily having 
direct physical contact or even communication between the extremist nodes and the mass of passive 
supporters. Galam defines passive supporters of the jihadist cause as 'normal' people who do not necessarily 
express their position explicitly; often this is an individual attitude associated with a personal opinion. It 
does not need to be explicitly so. They are unnoticeable, and most of them reject the violent aspect of the 
jihadist action. They only share their cause in part. The degree of permeability of the social context 
determines the limits of the geo-social space open to jihadist actions. This is a different form of analysis than 
the social network analysis which we used, for example, to analyze the 9/11 Hijackers’ network insofar as it 
does not depend upon Watts-Strogatz small world network relationships or a Hamiltonian path [11][12]. 
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2.0 The Galam Percolation Model of Terrorism 
 
Our starting point was Serge Galam's percolation model [9].  Galam models terrorism as a function of the 
percolation of active terrorists across a complex landscape of passive cells which either support (allow 
percolation) or do not support (deny) percolation to the terrorist.  This landscape is represented by a grid 
whereby for a single individual to move across the lattice he must pass from one cell to another, via the 
intermediate adjacent cells. Let us consider a terrorist node that wishes to move safely from its nucleus to 
another social space in the lattice. In Galam's model, the relative number of passive supporters of the 
terrorist cause with respect to the total population in a given region is compared to the critical percolation 
threshold for the said region. This comparison is what determines the effective scope of the terrorist threat. 
As soon as the density of passive supporters of the terrorist cause rises above the percolation threshold, the 
entire territory is under threat of terrorist action. In the context shown here, it is not sufficient to neutralize 
the nodes of the terrorist network to ensure that a specific area remains free from threat. Once the terrorist 
network has been stopped, another one will, after a time, take its place and so conserve intact the possibility 
of a new, immediate attack in all the social-geographical space accessible to its members via the percolant 
pathways [13]. The pathways through the region which have been established by the passive supporters of 
the terrorist cause remain intact unless and until specific action is taken to dismantle them or otherwise 
lower their density below the percolation threshold. From this point of view, passive supporters of the 
terrorist cause are the weak ties of terrorist networks, but they are also critical enablers of terrorist attacks. 
 
Galam argues that in order for a terrorist to act they must find a path within a safe social space. Thus, the 
determination of the terrorist range of destruction is not merely based upon the terrorist net itself but on the 
geographical and social permeability of its members; much in the way that Mao stated that "A revolutionary 
activist must be like a fish in water while in the popular masses".  In the Galam model, the relative number 
of passive supporters is compared with the total population of a given region and a critical percolation 
threshold calculated. Therefore, terrorist groups and networks are seen to interact and move through the 
social geographical 'phase space' made accessible by non-passive support. The adaptivity and power of 
jihadist networks hence lies in their ability to navigate the landscape of passive supporters. In Galam's 
percolation model, for a given territory, the distribution and size of aggregate spaces yielded by its passive 
supporters directly determines the range of terrorist action. It is the relative value of the passive support of 
the population    compared with the value of the critical point    of the corresponding space that determines 
the effective amplitude of the terrorist threat. In other words, the passive support of the population   yields a 
threshold value, that when compared with the value of the critical point    of the corresponding space, 
determines whether the line has been crossed and a terrorist event will occur.  If the passive support is larger 
than the percolation threshold then all territory falls under terrorist threat. We can calculate the value of the 
critical point critical point   . A universal formula holds for site percolation where: 
 
                 
              (1) 
 
where   is the connectivity of the network (the average number of immediate neighbors of a site),   is the 
dimension of the space within which the network is embedded and with          and         . (See 
the following diagram from Galam’s original study.) 
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Figure 1: Example of the relationships between Connectivity, Dimension & Threshold within the Universal Site Percolation 
Formula (from [9]) 
 
 
 
In the Galam model, much of the enabling behavior for terrorism simply requires a landscape with a 
minimum number of passive supporters. In most cases a small number of passive supporters is sufficient to 
create a landscape over which terrorist activity can percolate. Terrorist deployment thus obeys a universal 
scheme of activity with two phases, a percolating phase and a non-percolating phase. The only difference 
from one form of terrorism to another is the scale on which passive supporters are spread and the 
geographical area on which percolation may take place. Obviously if the change of scale does not change 
the nature of the terrorist phenomenon, it modifies in a substantial manner the number of threatened people. 
This change in scope is clearly not a negligible difference. It is the case of September 11, which while 
revealing for the first time the existence of a world-wide percolation also showed simultaneously that from 
now on, the entire world’s population could be in danger. 
 
Of critical importance is Galam’s demonstration that phase transition from landscapes where percolation is 
impossible to landscapes where percolation is possible requires only a small addition of passive supporters.  
He argues that because of this, overwhelming military presence will not create a solution to terrorism, and 
that a more fruitful approach may be to reduce the social dimensionality of the percolation space.  Galam 
suggests that for a social application of percolation, the network connectivity could be of the order of 15 and 
the dimension be 2 (i.e. the 2 dimensional 'flat' surface of the earth). For these suggested values,        . 
In other words, a density of 25% of passive supporters - this means that 25% of the earth's population are 
passive supporters of terrorism. Galam goes on to conclude that this percentage is 'totally out of context': he 
keeps       and changes   to 15. This yields a value of 6% which he deems to be a much closer 
representation of the real value (i.e. 6% of the world's population are passive supporters). Galam's reasoning 
is that we are actually dealing with a geographical-social lattice, so the dimension   is the sum of the 
physical dimension         and a memetic dimension   , where        .  We shall look at the 25% 
value presently. Miralles Canals [13] suggests the following list of 10 memetic dimensions: 
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Figure 2. Memetic values chosen by Miralles Canals given in [14] 
 
Note should be taken that it is the memes – the narrative or the ideology that these memes are indicators for 
– that drive the process. In the political dimension this means that the extremists drive the process. But they 
require an environment, oxygen, to drive the process, the fire. Therefore, there is a feedback structure 
between this extremist, political group, and the population that moves the system (or not) to the critical 
point
9
.  In order to study the actual possible relationships that drive the universal percolation formula we 
examined ethnographic data from Spain and the UK. The Spanish calculations are based on Miralles Canals 
paper of 2009 [14] (we have also corrected some of the numerical errors in this paper). Miralles Canals’ 
original calculations are shown below for reference: 
 
Figure 4. Miralles Canals’ original calculation results as given in [14] 
 
 
Miralles Canals assumes the following values taken via an application of the Clarke Layers model [14]. The 
Clarke layers model is simply an estimate of the classification of extremists within the world Muslim 
population:  
 
 
                                                          
9 
As an example of our thinking, Hitler won the German federal election of July 1932 with a 37.27% vote. Thus, the 
ideological ‘meme’s’ that fed the political process to the critical point (the ‘win’) were ‘pumping’ or ‘stoking’ the 
percolation mechanism. Hitler maneuvered and choreographed his ideological outlook depending upon the feedback 
from his audience i.e. the collective consciousness of the people that supported him. It was the 60 or so percent of the 
rest of the population that allowed this process to reach critical point. 
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Figure 5. Clark layer values chosen by Miralles Canals given in [14] 
 
World Muslim Population 1 x 108 
Jihadist Supporters 200 to 500 x 106  =  
13.33 to 33.33% 
Jihadist Groups 50 to 200 x 103  = 
 0.0033 to 0.0133% 
Active Terrorists 200 to 500 x 103  = 
 0.000027 to 0.000133% 
 
Applying the Clarke Layers to the Muslim demographic population values given in the Miralles Canals paper we 
obtain the following results: 
 
Figure 6. Social and Political space for Spain as calculated by the Authors 
 
Autonomous 
Community 
AC 
Total 
Population 
(TP) 
Moslem 
Population 
(MP) 
%  
Ratio 
MP/TP 
NJW 
Lower 
Bound 
NJW 
Upper 
Bound 
PSJ Lower 
Bound 
PSJ Upper 
Bound 
p 10^-5 
Lower 
Bound 
p 10^-5 
Upper Bound 
Catalonia 7354441 279027 3.8% 9 36 37194 93000 506 1265 
Madrid 6251876 196689 3% 6 26 26219 65556 419 1049 
Andalucía 8177805 184430 2% 6 24 24585 61471 301 752 
Valencia 5016348 130471 3% 4 17 17392 43486 347 867 
Murcia 1424063 63040 4% 2 8 8403 21011 590 1475 
Canary Isles 2070465 54636 3% 2 7 7283 18210 352 880 
Melilla 71339 34397 48% 1 4 4585 11465 6427 16070 
Castilla-La 
Mancha 2038956 32960 2% 1 4 4394 10986 215 539 
Aragon 1325272 30982 2% 1 4 4130 10326 312 779 
Ceuta 77320 30537 39% 1 4 4071 10178 5265 13163 
Balears 1071221 25859 2% 1 3 3447 8619 322 805 
Castilla y 
Leon 2553301 17336 1% 1 2 2311 5778 91 226 
Basque 
Lands 2155546 16608 1% 1 2 2214 5535 103 257 
Extremadura 1095894 15536 1% 1 2 2071 5178 189 473 
Navarra 619114 10884 2% 0 1 1451 3628 234 586 
La Rioja 317020 10373 3% 0 1 1383 3457 436 1091 
Galicia 2783100 6070 0% 0 1 809 2023 29 73 
Asturias 1079215 2731 0% 0 0 364 910 34 84 
Cantabria 581215 2179 0% 0 0 290 726 50 125 
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Figure 7. Bounds for Social and Political space for Spain as calculated by the Authors 
 
 
Autonomous 
Community 
AC 
PSJ % of TP  
Lower 
Bound 
PSJ % of TP  
Upper 
Bound 
p Upper 
Bound  
p for 
Upper 
Bound as a 
% 
Catalonia 1 1 0.01 1.26 
Madrid 0 1 0.01 1.05 
Andalucía 0 1 0.01 0.75 
Valencia 0 1 0.01 0.87 
Murcia 1 1 0.01 1.48 
Canary Isles 0 1 0.01 0.88 
Melilla 6 16 0.16 16.07 
Castilla-La 
Mancha 0 1 0.01 0.54 
Aragon 0 1 0.01 0.78 
Ceuta 5 13 0.13 13.16 
Balears 0 1 0.01 0.80 
Castilla y 
Leon 0 0 0.00 0.23 
Basque 
Lands 0 0 0.00 0.26 
Extremadura 0 0 0.00 0.47 
Navarra 0 1 0.01 0.59 
La Rioja 0 1 0.01 1.09 
Galicia 0 0 0.00 0.07 
Asturias 0 0 0.00 0.08 
Cantabria 0 0 0.00 0.12 
 
 
The recalculated results are significant in a number of ways. First, it should be noted that the passive 
supporter values for Ceuta and Melilla are much larger than those for Catalonia, Madrid and Andalucía.  
According to these values, therefore, we would expect a greater probability of terrorist events for Ceuta and 
Melilla than for Catalonia, Madrid and Andalucía (all of which have larger Muslim populations but smaller 
populations in proportion to the non-Muslim population). But this has not been the case in reality. Note also 
that the number of terrorist nodes is fewer for Ceuta and Melilla than it is for Catalonia, Madrid and 
Andalucía.  
 
One explanation for this disparity can be attributed to the method by which passive supporter numbers are 
calculated in [14]: the values are calculated from the numerical values of the Muslim population within an 
Autonomous Community; there are no non-Muslim contributors to the passive supporter values in the above 
tables. The   value  for Ceuta is around 13%, in other words 13% of the Muslim population of Ceuta are 
calculated as passive supporters of terrorism, whilst the   value for Madrid (where the bombings actually 
occurred is around 1%). From a conceptual viewpoint, there is no reason why passive supporters should be 
drawn solely from the Muslim population. Our conclusion, therefore, is that passive supporters from the 
non-Muslim population (signified as a percentage of the non-Muslim population within an Autonomous 
Community) should be contributing to the   value. Do we see something similar in other data? We would 
have liked to have included French data in our study (due to the increased occurrences of terrorism in that 
country) but for historical reasons France does not collect data on religious demographics. We have 
therefore used UK data [6] (from the 2011 census published in 2015) to undertake a   value calculation 
similar to the Spanish examples:  
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Figure 8. Social and Political space for UK as calculated by the Authors 
Region 
Total 
Population 
(TP) 
Moslem 
Population 
(MP) 
%  
Ratio 
MP/TP 
NJW 
Lower 
Bound 
NJW 
Upper 
Bound 
PSJ Lower 
Bound 
PSJ Upper 
Bound 
p 10^-5 
Lower 
Bound 
p 10^-5 
Upper 
Bound 
London 8173941 1012823 12.4% 33 132 135009 337574 1652 4130 
West Mids 5601847 376152 6.7% 12 49 50141 125371 895 2238 
North West 7052177 356458 5.1% 12 46 47516 118807 674 1685 
Yorks and 
Humber 5283733 326050 6.2% 11 42 43462 108672 823 2057 
South East 8634750 201651 2.3% 7 26 26880 67210 311 778 
East of 
England 5846965 148341 2.5% 5 19 19774 49442 338 846 
East Mids 4533222 140649 3.1% 5 18 18749 46878 414 1034 
South West 5288935 51228 1.0% 2 7 6829 17074 129 323 
North East 2596886 46764 1.8% 2 6 6234 15586 240 600 
 
 
Figure 9. Bounds for Social and Political space for UK as calculated by the Authors 
 
 
Region 
PSJ % of TP  
Lower 
Bound 
PSJ % of TP  
Upper 
Bound 
p Upper 
Bound  
p for Upper 
Bound as a % 
London 2 4 0.04 4.13 
West Mids 1 2 0.02 2.24 
North West 1 2 0.02 1.68 
Yorks and 
Humber 1 2 0.02 2.06 
South East 0 1 0.01 0.78 
East of 
England 0 1 0.01 0.85 
East Mids 0 1 0.01 1.03 
South West 0 0 0.00 0.32 
North East 0 1 0.01 0.60 
 
 
 
From the above calculations, it can be seen that the UK has a different demographic from Spain insofar as 
there are no regions within the UK that mirror the high Muslim population density of Ceuta and Melilla. 
Secondly, Islamic terrorist events have occurred within London (and this corresponds to London having the 
highest   value) and not other regions, so we must look for other data to examine if there are any visible 
patterns concerning non-Muslim population effects within the UK. Whilst the West (as personified by 
America and its ally the UK) is often the target of jihadist attacks, a number of attacks have also targeted the 
Jewish community and have often done so simultaneously with other terrorist events. One argument behind 
the reason the Jewish community often is targeted by Muslim extremists is that Jews provide an existential 
threat to extremist Muslims: the very existence of Jews is a form of proof that Islam is based on a false 
premise (i.e., if Jews were alive at the time of Mohammed, then why did they not become Muslims? A 
characteristic of some Islamic terrorist events is that they contain both the language and the actions of 
humiliation and killing of Jews which makes up part of the 'proof' that Islam is God's 'Final Testament'). It is 
not surprising, therefore, that Jewish targets were struck as part of the Charlie Hebdo events in Paris. Our 
next question therefore was: what is the pattern of violence that the UK Jewish population was subjected to 
that possibly mirrors the threshold calculations in the above tables? The UK demographics that include 
Jewish and Muslim data are given in the following table: 
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Figure 10. Population demographics as given by the 2011 UK Census [6] 
 
Location 
Population: 
All 
Population: 
Jewish  
Population: 
Muslim 
Muslim Ratio 
to Jews 
% Muslims in 
Population 
England & 
Wales 56075912 263346 2706066 10:1 5 
England  53012456 261282 2660116 10:1 5 
London 8173941 148602 1012823 7:1 12 
West Mids 5601847 4621 376152 81:1 7 
North West 7052177 30417 356458 12:1 5 
Yorks and 
Humber 5283733 9929 326050 33:1 6 
South East 8634750 17761 201651 11:1 2 
East of 
England 5846965 34830 148341 4:1 3 
East Mids 4533222 4254 140649 33:1 3 
South West 5288935 6365 51228 8:1 1 
North East 2596886 4503 46764 10:1 2 
Wales 3063456 2064 45950 22:1 1 
 
 
The CST Report for 2013 [16] states that over three-quarters of the total anti-Semitic incidents (of all types) 
recorded in 2013 took place in Greater London and Greater Manchester (the North West Region), the two 
largest Jewish communities in the UK. Within Greater London, the borough where the highest number of 
anti-Semitic incidents was recorded was Barnet. Barnet has the largest Jewish community of any local 
authority in the UK. Anti-Semitic attacks are greatest in number not only in areas of high Jewish population 
but also of regions of high non-Jewish and non-Muslim population but the CST does not give a breakdown 
of the demographics behind the incidents (e.g. far right Anti-Semitism verses any other type). 
 
From the CST Report, we find that the general breakdown of types of anti-Semitic incidents are as follows:  
Anti-Semitic incidents in Greater Manchester are more likely to involve random street racism – what might 
be called anti-Semitic hooliganism – against individual Jews.   Ideologically motivated Anti-Semitism tends 
to be concentrated in Greater London where most of the Jewish community’s leadership bodies and public 
figures are based and where there is the greatest population of Jews. For example, 55% of anti-Semitic 
incidents recorded by CST in Greater Manchester targeted individual Jews in public, compared to 25% of 
the incidents recorded in Greater London.  Similarly, 21% of incidents recorded in Greater London targeted 
Jewish organizations, events or communal leaders, compared to just 2 % of the incidents in Greater 
Manchester. However, 'Abusive behavior' was more common in London by a factor of 1.8:1 but reported 
assault was less in London than Manchester (by a factor of 1:1.4).  
 
To summarize, Anti-Semitic incidents are greatest where there is the greatest concentration of Jews in a Region (and 
therefore the greatest visibility).  London has a larger Jewish community than Manchester. Note that the proportion 
of Jews to Muslims does not seem to be a factor here.  The West Midlands, where the ratio of Muslims to Jews is 
81:1, has few recorded incidents of Anti-Semitism. The greatest levels of anti-Semitic attacks are in regions where 
there is the largest overall population (London and the North West). The level of anti-Semitic violence is greater for 
Manchester than it is in London possibly because of the visibility of the Jewish population combined with a 12:1 
ratio of Muslims to Jews.   Our next question therefore is  “If the level of Anti-Semitism and by implication Islamic 
extremist 'events' is linked to the Jewish population, the Muslim population and non-Muslim passive supporters, then 
is there something that links all three?”  The answer is a resounding “Yes” and the thing which most profoundly links 
all three is Israel. 
 
What are the reasons for non-Muslims to be passive supporters of terrorism? First, we should look at why 
non-Muslims would be antagonistic (passive or non-passive) towards the State of Israel (as opposed being 
anti-Semitic). The ideological causes of antagonism fall into three general areas: 
 
 The belief in civil rights over security - the argument that the humiliation that has been experienced 
by the Palestinians cannot be justified by continued Israeli fears of terrorist attacks.  In its more 
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extreme forms, this argument can be extended to the idea that Israeli defense measures are actually 
“aggression” against the Palestinians and against other states in the region. 
 The belief that it is morally correct to support the (perceived) underdog. This position is justified 
by the argument that someone's material position is mostly a function of their conditions rather than 
their choices. In this context, the argument further goes that the Palestinians are much poorer than 
the Israelis because of the way Israel controls and suffocates the Palestinian economy, which in 
turn is what leads Palestinians to radicalism.  This argument is in part a recapitulation of nationalist 
arguments made throughout the twentieth century and often emerges in one form or another as the 
thesis that rich nations are the cause of poverty and misfortune in poor nations. 
 The “politically correct” notion that the conflict between Israel, the Palestinians and Israel’s Arab 
neighbors is one between a white people and a non-white people, and it is therefore morally correct 
to support the non-white people. In this context, however incorrectly, Israelis are identified as 
white and Palestinians as non-white.   
 
However, criticism of Israel is not necessarily Anti-Semitism.  As a result, the question arises as to how the 
level of Anti-Semitism and (by implication) Islamic extremist 'events' is connected to (a) the size of the 
Jewish population, (b) the size of the Muslim population and (c) the size of the non-Muslim passive 
supporters. This question can be particularly difficult to unravel.  Part of the answer lies in the fact that there 
is only one Jewish state and that state is irrevocably tied up with the Jewish population outside of Israel. The 
reason for this link is not necessarily 19th Century type nationalism (or the twentieth century type 
nationalism referenced above) but rather, that Israel was seen, and still is, by Jewish victims as a possible 
haven from anti-Semitic violence
10
.  However, the continued violence within the area currently occupied by 
the State of Israel against Jews both before and after the founding of the State of Israel has meant that Israel 
is, and has always been, seen by Jews as very much a part of the Diaspora.   
 
Some insight, we believe can be gained by examining the difference between 'non-violence' and 'not violent'. 
Non-violence is the epithet given to the political thought inspired by Gandhi and Martin Luther King among 
others in recent history. While ‘non-violence’ activism can contain an array of direct actions and coercive 
tactics such as hunger-strikes, acts of civil disobedience, sanctions, etc. it is the very opposite of the pro-
violent politics of extremism that regards killing as necessary. Not-violent, on the other hand, is simply the 
absence of violence. Not-violence is simply one end of the full spectrum of asymmetric warfare. But one 
person's non-violence can be seen as another person's not-violence. Where does supposedly justifiable 
defensive violence cross over into terrorism? How is this ambiguity seen in a social context? For example, if 
Israel is responsible for the Middle East conflict then the BDS (Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions 
movement) is an example of a practical way to do something about it. However, many within the UK Jewish 
community are finding communal life increasingly difficult due to the BDS and have memories of the Nazis 
boycotting Jewish shops and goods in the past. Where is the line between non-violence and not-violence?
11
 
                                                          
10
 As seen not only by members of the French Jewish population who have recently emigrated to Israel because of 
increased Anti-Semitism but also by the majority of the 'forgotten' 850,000 Jews who did likewise because they were 
expelled from Muslim countries, with next to nothing, on the creation of the State of Israel.  
11 The difficulties in perceiving and determining these lines in the sand can be demonstrated by the following. 
During 2013 CST received reports of 465 potential incidents that, after investigation, were not included in the total of 
529 anti-Semitic incidents.  An example of one of the anti-Israel incidents (that was not recorded as Anti-Semitism 
even though it was using Anti-Semitic iconography of Jews being vermin and stealing from others) was a letter to a 
charity stating: "You are attempting to legitimize theft, you thieving c**ts! Give the Palestinians their land back. You 
f*****g parasites.”. With respect to Western attitudes, the criticism of possible indiscriminate or non-proportional 
use of force is often couched in a language that may be interpreted as reminiscent of the Blood Libel. It may be that 
two thousand years of Christian ideology with respect to Jews is not easily removed. See for example, with respect to 
the chants of 'baby killer' https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Little_Saint_Hugh_of_Lincoln and 
https://www.facebook.com/israeladvocacymovement/videos/vb.829113587172986/928146197269724/?type=2&thea
ter. The same can also be said of extremist Islamic religious ideology: see footage from a demonstration in London 
on 08 December 2017.  Calls can be heard of 'Khaybar Khaybar, ya yahud, Jaish Muhammad, sa yahud' – Jews, 
remember Khaybar, the army of Muhammad is coming. The placards in this video are from the Palestine Solidarity 
Campaign (of whom, Jeremy Corbyn, Leader of the UK Labour Party is a patron) https://youtu.be/Zi2X19xaH0Y. 
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As Galam argues [17]: “The main feature of a passive supporter is that it is someone who would not oppose 
a terrorist move if it could, since it shares the terrorist goal, at least in part. Or it could also be because the 
supporter opposes the political power which is fighting terrorism. It is of importance to emphasize that most 
passive supporters are never confronted by any terrorist move. It might possibly be perceived as a neutral 
attitude towards the political content of a terrorist trend.”  It is significant that both the extreme Left and 
extremist Islamists – both ideologies that hope for some future ‘perfect’ state - criticize the USA and Israel 
and are viewed as the source of all the world ills
12
. It is also noteworthy that the USA and Israel were 
countries both born from the desire for freedom – from the moral perspective of Western, Judeo-Christian 
culture (as exemplified in the US Constitution and the desire by a significant part of the European and 
Middle Eastern Jewish population’s wish for the freedom not to be persecuted1314). Our main point therefore 
is that it is not at all clear what can constitute the numerical population value for passive support within a 
general population:  10%? 25%? A value may possibly be approximated by the collection of granular, 
individualized data.  
 
One final issue with the Galam model is the calculation of the number of memes fed into the universal 
percolation formula. The meme table is not a scorecard - thus every meme has an equal weighting - and the 
model does not presently distinguish between the types of terrorist events that affect the socio-political 
geographical landscape.  Lone wolves are treated the same as politically motivated attacks (the Madrid 
bombings, for example, were designed to cause a change in an election result). It is quite apparent, 
furthermore, that other groups besides jihadists (for example, anti-globalization terrorists) may use similar 
memetic methods
15
 in perpetrating their agenda.  
 
Our response therefore is twofold: 
 Obtain additional data by which the percolation model can be further examined; 
 Develop a fractal based dynamic meta model that describes spatio-temporal aspects of terrorist 
events (in a similar way that we undertook with attrition warfare see [4]) 
 
3.0 Summary 
 
In this paper, we have initiated an attempt to develop and understand the physics that underlies terrorist 
events. Our main conclusion from this initial study is that the non-active permeation of terrorist ideologies 
(which we call 'passive support') through the social, political and psychological fabric of society not only 
contributes to the active participation of terrorists within society but also directly contributes to and 
increases the likelihood of the occurrence of terrorist events.  However, from the perspective of our previous 
work on the physics of human systems [4], [5], [19] this current paper merely provides insight into the 
highest tier of the modeling environment (the 'strategic' or 'percolation' tier). In a further paper, we hope to 
demonstrate a more extensive Galam model - going some way towards addressing the questions raised 
above - expanding our study to non-European data together with constructing a model , at the middle, or 
'operational' tier, that is, a fractal dynamic model. The final and most granular, behavioral, tier, the 'tactical' 
tier, will be developed as part of a further study. The advantage of constructing such a model hierarchy is 
that each level would mutually validate the other model levels. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                       
What is significant to our study is that the incident was little reported in the UK national press, indicating that it was 
not newsworthy (the implication therefore is that no one cared i.e. we are observing an example of passive support 
and another case of casual anti-semitism from the general UK population). 
12
 See for example Noam Chomsky’s series of lectures e.g. https://youtu.be/lUQ_0MubbcM 
13
 See for example https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Antisemitism_in_Europe 
14
 See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Category:Anti-Jewish_pogroms_by_Muslims 
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 Rapid mimetic communication characterizes social media usage. Social media, however, is further characterized 
by individuals ability to tune the content transmitted and viewed. The net result is that perspectives and opinions are 
even greater polarized. There is a suggestion that 21st century, terrorism is morphing. A unique combination of past 
doctrines, modern recruiting methods, advanced technology, and extremists’ relentless desire to destroy all that is not 
within the purviews of Islam point to a further 'wave' of terrorism in the near future. More importantly, Islamic 
extremism does not appear to be the sole contributor to this possible new wave of terrorism [18]. 
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Figure 11. Meta-Model Hierarchy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This further study will propose novel applications of complex adaptive systems theory to develop massive 
automated parallel processing systems which will enable the tracking and mapping of the dynamics of 
money laundering behaviors and derive their causal and identification factors in real time. The methodology 
of this 'operational' tier is similar to that proposed in our previous work on the Fractal nature of Warfare [3] 
and consists of undertaking a mathematical study of a dynamical system whose solutions are the non-linear 
equations that exhibit complex temporal and spatial behavior. The underlying concept behind such studies is 
that of the chaotic or strange attractor and the parameters which define the basin of attraction of the 
phenomenon under study. These attractors are different from simple attractors (point attractors) or attractors 
that decay into periodic states (limit cycles) in that they decay into a non-periodic and complex final state. 
Once this final state is identified, a number of measures can be taken in order to identify and quantify its 
nature. The methodology, therefore, consists of undertaking data analysis using high-performance 
computing systems to create algorithms that identify and predict criminal or terrorist behavior not merely by 
looking at previous data characteristics and pattern matching but rather by developing the 'physics' behind 
these networks and creating a multidimensional, dynamic 'landscape' or phase space that describes and 
characterizes this complex behavior. Building on the mathematical construct of this landscape we could then 
identify and examine criminal behavioral 'attractors' within the landscape.  These attractors would include 
salient features from the demographic, political, financial and legal landscape.  This research would 
constitute the first attempt to model these factors in this fashion in this type of context. For 4GW, data 
sources for both the USA and the rest of the world are available from the Global Terrorism Database
16
. This 
would allow an initial study at the operational level to be undertaken.  
 
Lastly, the UK government has recently implemented the Mindspace program on how public behavior may 
be influenced using public policy
17
. This program demonstrates because how behavioral theory, together 
with collection of individualized data, could help achieve better outcomes for citizens, either by 
complementing more established policy tools, or by suggesting more innovative interventions. In doing so, 
this draws upon the most recent academic evidence, as well as exploring the wide range of existing good 
work in applying behavioral theory across the public sector. The behaviorist methodologies and data 
collected would be able to provide an initial framework for a tactical tier model
18
. 
 
 
                                                          
16
 See http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/ 
17
 https://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/sites/default/files/publications/MINDSPACE.pdf 
18
 Examples of the practical implementation of Big Data collection, analysis and use of behavioural science on the 
back of the Mindspace program can be seen at http://www.thebehaviouralist.com 
Strategic Tier: 
Galam Model 
Operational 
Tier: Fractal 
Model 
Tactical Tier: 
Dynamic Landscape 
Behaviorist Model 
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